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Stochastic general equilibrium models of small open economies with occasionally binding
￿nancial frictions are capable of mimicking both the business cycles and the crisis events as-
sociated with the sudden stop in access to credit markets (Mendoza, 2010). This paper studies
the inef￿ciencies associated with borrowing decisions in a two-sector small open production
economy, ￿nding that this economy is much more likely to display ￿under-borrowing￿ rather
than ￿over-borrowing￿ in normal times. As a result, macro-prudential policies (e.g, Tobin
taxes or economy-wide controls on capital in￿ows) are costly in welfare terms. Moreover,
macro-prudential policies aimed at minimizing the probability of the crisis event might be
welfare-reducing in production economies. The analysis shows that there is a much larger
scope for welfare gains from policy interventions during ￿nancial crises. That is to say that, ex
post or crisis-management policies dominate ex ante or macro-prudential ones.
JEL Classi￿cations: E52, F37, F41
Keywords: Capitalcontrols, Crises, Financialfrictions, Macro-prudentialpolicies, Bailouts,
Overborrowing
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The great recession of 2007-2009 vividly illustrated the importance of ￿nancial market imperfec-
tions for emerging and advanced economies alike. For emerging markets this fact is old news, as
￿nancial imperfections have long been recognized as an important source of business cycle ￿uctu-
ations and crises in these countries. The great recession of 2007-2009 and the long series of crises
in emerging markets beforehand have shown that ￿nancial market imperfections result in periods
in which capital market access is curtailed and expenditure plans have to be adjusted suddenly.
These periods￿labelled in the literature as credit crunches and sudden stops￿are associated with
large declines in consumption, output, relative prices, and asset prices.
Macroeconomic models with occasionally binding ￿nancial frictions(e.g., Mendoza, 2010)
have proven capable of describing both the regular business cycle (i.e., normal times when market
access is unconstrained) and crisis events (when market access is curtailed). The distinctive fea-
ture of these models is the fact that the underlying ￿nancial friction binds only occasionally and
the crisis is an endogenous event.
The contribution of this paper is to analyze the normative implications of this class of models
and discuss what broad set of policies will best mitigate the consequences of those ￿nancial fric-
tions. To do so we focus on a two-sector small open economy model as in Mendoza (2002), taking
as given that it is a useful lens through which to understand the economics of sudden stops.1
The scope for policy intervention in this class of models follows from a price externality (or
a pecuniary or credit externality) that arises because agents do not internalize the effect of their
individual decisions on a key market price entering the speci￿cation of the ￿nancial friction￿
see Arnott, Greenwald, and Stiglitz (1994) for a discussion. Because of this externality, it has
been shown that in models like the one we analyze there is the potential for inef￿cient borrowing
to occur (e.g., FernÆndez-Arias and Lombardo, 1998; Uribe, 2007; and Lorenzoni, 2008). This
inef￿ciency is measured and quanti￿ed by comparing the amount that individual agents borrow
in the competitive equilibrium (CE) of the economy with the amount that a social planner would
choose in an economy subject to the same occasionally binding credit constraint (SP).
By considering the role of the credit externality in a multi-sector production economy, we ￿rst
show that the direction of inef￿cient borrowing is ambiguous (i.e., production economies might
display over- or underborrowing). In our benchmark economy, however, underborrowing is a ro-
bust feature of the competitive equilibrium allocation. From a policy perspective, the claim that
macro-prudential policies in the form of a tax on borrowing or capital controls can restore ef￿-
ciency is not robust at best. In our benchmark economy, imposing on the competitive equilibrium
1Both Mendoza (2002) and Benigno et al. (2009) provide a detailed discussion of the model. Bianchi (2010) uses an
endowment version of this model.
2allocation a one percent tax on borrowing in tranquil times is welfare-reducing. Despite reducing
the probability of a crisis event to zero, macro-prudential policies are costly as they reduce the
average consumption level. Second, we also document that the welfare gap between the social
planner and the competitive allocation is larger when the crisis occurs (i.e., when the constraint
is binding), suggesting that policy interventions during crisis times (such as bailouts or lending of
last resort) are more relevant (in welfare terms) than ex ante ones. The policy implication is that
models that eliminate this potential source of ex post inef￿ciency bias upward the calculation of
the welfare gains from ex ante intervention policies.
The mechanisms behind our main ￿ndings depend on the interaction between the credit ex-
ternality and the consumption and labor decisions by agents. In general agents will try to insure
against the crisis event (i.e., the possibility that the constraint becomes binding). While in an en-
dowment economy agents self-insure by saving more, in a production economy self-insurance also
occurs through labor supply choices. The presence of the credit externality creates a gap between
the way competitive agents value consumption and production decisions (private value) versus
the way decisions are valued by the social planner (social value) determining the possibility of
inef￿cient behavior.
The general equilibrium interaction between consumption and labor supply decisions can be
summarized in three separate effects arising from the presence of the externality: an ￿intertemporal
effect,￿ a ￿production effect,￿ and an ￿intrasectoral allocation effect.￿ The intertemporal effect
of the externality is well known: because of the credit constraint the marginal social value of
saving (the marginal value in the social planner allocation) is higher than the private value (in
the competitive equilibrium allocation). Thus, the intertemporal effect of the externality implies
that private agents overborrow in the competitive equilibrium allocation and overconsume tradable
goods (see Bianchi, 2010). But, while in endowment economies there is no other effect from
the externality, in multi-sector production economies the intertemporal allocation of consumption
in￿uences labor supply and production decisions via relative price changes. As a result, in our
model, the externality also affects the total labor supply and its sector composition or allocation.
Speci￿cally, all else being equal, via changes in relative prices, the relatively lower private
value of saving induced by the credit externality can generate a lower private value of supply-
ing additional labor compared to the social one. Lower private production and consumption of
domestically produced goods (both tradable and non-tradable goods) can then lead to lower bor-
rowing relative to what is socially desirable, and thus generate the possibility of underborrowing.
In addition, while total labor supply tends to be lower than socially desirable, in our multi-sector
production economy, the externality also in￿uences the intrasectoral allocation of labor and pro-
duction. In our benchmark economy, for given total labor supply, the planner will allocate more
resources towards the tradable sector than private agents. As a result, the planner will produce
3and consume less non-tradable goods than private agents, implying lower tradable consumption
and higher saving in the social planner allocation relative to the competitive equilibrium. The rel-
ative tilt in the socially desirable allocation of labor towards tradable production will then tend to
reinforce overborrowing in the competitive equilibrium of the model.
The net result of these three effects determines whether in equilibrium the model economy
displays over- or underborrowing. In our baseline calibration, the sum of these three contrasting
forces results in underborrowing in equilibrium. More generally though, these general equilibrium
interactionssuggestthattherelativestrengthoftheseeffectscreateambiguityinthedirectionofthe
inef￿cient borrowing. In our analysis, these mechanisms on the production side of the economy
are robust to a variety of model speci￿cations, in which the collateral constraint is speci￿ed in
terms of asset prices rather than relative price of nontradables or the presence of working capital
constraint.
Our welfare analysis shows the importance of focusing on the effects of credit externality in
production economies. Differently from the endowment case, the planner can affect the value of
the collateral by altering the production mix and the relative prices: this also creates a gap between
the competitive and the planner allocation in crisis times. Given an overall welfare gain of moving
from the CE to the SP allocation, which is about 0.12 percent of permanent consumption, we ￿nd
that these gains increase by about 25 percent to 0.15 percent if we focus only on the crisis states.
Thus, while our ￿underborrowing￿ result implies that borrowing should be subsidized rather than
taxed in both good and bad times, our welfare analysis shows that intervening in crisis times is
more important than in normal times. More generally, our result implies that the welfare gains
of policy intervention during a crisis is greater than outside those periods, suggesting that ex post
policies are likely to be more important than ex ante ones in this class of models.
A set of related studies has examined the policy implications of the same credit externality
we focus on in this paper. Korinek (2010) and Bianchi (2010) use endowment versions of the
economy we study and ￿nd that individual agents in the CE borrow more than in the SP (i.e.,
they overborrow) and advocate the use of macro-prudential policies (or more generally ex ante
intervention policies) in the form of a tax on international borrowing or economy-wide capital
controls as a way to restore ef￿ciency. Jeanne and Korinek (2010) and Bianchi and Mendoza
(2010) analyze models in which the price externality arises because agents fail to internalize the
effect of their decisions on an asset price rather than the relative price of non-tradable goods like
in our model. Their analysis and policy conclusions are similar to those of Korinek (2010) and
Bianchi (2010). All these model economies exhibit overborrowing, and an ex ante intervention
policy is the proper tool to restore ef￿ciency. In addition, these models are such that ex post
intervention policies such as bailouts or any lending of last resort have no scope. This is because,
by assumption, in crisis periods, the CE and SP allocations cannot differ when the credit constraint
4binds in these models.2
The model that we use in this paper is standard, except for the occasionally binding credit
constraint. The occasionally binding credit constraint is embedded in a two-sector (tradable and
non-tradable good) small open economy in which ￿nancial markets are not only incomplete but
also imperfect, as in Mendoza (2002). The asset menu is restricted to a one-period risk-free bond
paying off the exogenously given foreign interest rate. In addition to asset market incompleteness,
we assume that access to foreign ￿nancing is constrained to a fraction of households’ total income.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the two-sector production
model we use and explains the working of the credit externality in this set-up. Section 3 discusses
its solution, parametrization and performance. Section 4 compares the CE and the SP equilibria
of the baseline model economy we study, discusses the robustness of the main ￿ndings of the
numerical analysis, and quanti￿es the welfare gains or costs of Tobin taxes in this model set-up.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The model that we use is a simple two-sector (tradable and non-tradable) small open economy, in
which ￿nancial markets are not only incomplete but also imperfect as in Mendoza (2010), and in
which production occurs in both sectors.
2.1 Households




















with Cj denoting the individual consumption basket and Hj the individual supply of labor for the
tradable and non-tradable sectors (Hj = HT
j + HN
j ). The assumption of perfect substitutability
between labor services in the two sectors ensures that there is a unique labor market. For simplicity
we omit the j subscript for the remainder of this section, but it is understood that all choices are
made at the individual level. The elasticity of labor supply is ￿, while ￿ is the coef￿cient of
relative risk aversion. In (1), the preference speci￿cation follows from Greenwood, Hercowitz
and Huffman (GHH, 1988). In the context of a one-good economy this speci￿cation eliminates
2See Benigno et al. (2010) for a more detailed discussion of the related literature and a quantitative comparison
between production and endowment economies.
5the wealth effect from the labor supply choice. Here it is important to emphasize that in a multi-
good economy, the sectoral allocation of consumption will affect the labor supply decision through
relative prices.






















The parameter ￿ is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between consumption of tradable
and nontradable goods, while ! is the relative weight of tradable goods in the consumption basket.
We normalize the price of traded goods to 1. The relative price of the nontradable good is denoted
by P N. The aggregate price index is then given by
Pt =
h








where we note that there is a one-to-one link between the aggregate price index P and the relative
price P N:
Households maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, which is expressed in units of







t = ￿t + WtHt ￿ Bt+1 + (1 + i)Bt; (3)
where Wt is the wage in units of tradable goods, Bt+1 denotes the net foreign asset position at
the end of period t with gross real return 1 + i. Households receive pro￿ts, ￿t, from owning the
representative ￿rm. Their labor income is given by WtHt.
International ￿nancial markets are incomplete, and access to them is imperfect as well. The
asset menu includes only a one-period bond denominated in units of tradable consumption. In
addition, we assume that the amount that each individual can borrow internationally is limited by




[￿t + WtHt]: (4)
This constraint captures a balance sheet effect (e.g., Krugman, 1999, and Aghion, Bacchetta and
Banerjee, 2004) since foreign borrowing is denominated in units of tradables while the income that
can be pledged as collateral is generated in the non-tradable sector. The value of the collateral is
endogenous in this model as it depends on the current realization of pro￿ts and wage income. We
do not explicitly derive the credit constraint as the outcome of an optimal contract between lenders
and borrowers. However, we can interpret this constraint as the outcome of an interaction between
6lenders and borrowers in which lenders are not willing to permit borrowing beyond a certain limit.3
This limit depends on the parameter ￿ that measures the tightness of the borrowing constraint and
on current income that could be used as a proxy of future income.4
Households maximize (1) subject to (3) and (4) by choosing CN
t ;CT
t , Bt+1, and Ht. The




























































where ￿t is the multiplier on the period budget constraint and ￿t is the multiplier on the interna-
tional borrowing constraint. When the credit constraint is binding (￿t > 0), the Euler equation
(7) incorporates an effect that can be interpreted as arising from a country-speci￿c risk premium
on external ￿nancing. In this framework, even if the constraint is not binding at time t; there is
an intertemporal effect coming from the possibility that the constraint might be binding in the fu-




, which implies that current consumption of
tradeable goods would be lower compared to an economy in which access to foreign borrowing is
unconstrained.
From the previous conditions, we can combine (5) and (6) to obtain the intratemporal allocation


















3As emphasized by Arellano and Mendoza (2003), this form of liquidity constraint shares some features, namely the
endogeneity of the risk premium, that would be the outcome of the interaction between a risk-averse borrower and a
risk-neutral lender in a contracting framework as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). It is also consistent with anecdotal
evidence on lending criteria and guidelines used in mortgage and consumer ￿nancing.
4As we discuss in Benigno et al. (2009), a constraint expressed in terms of future income which could be the outcome
of the interaction between lenders and borrowers in a limited commitment environment would introduce further com-











































If we were in a one-good economy model, there would be no effect coming from the marginal
utility of consumption on the labour supply choice because of the GHH preference speci￿cation.





￿, and the labor supply curve
becomes steeper as PN falls.5 Note also that, when the constraint is binding (￿t > 0), the marginal
utility of supplying one more unit of labor is higher, and this helps to relax the constraint: when
￿t > 0, the labor supply becomes steeper and agents substitute leisure with labor to increase the
value of their collateral for given wages and prices. Given that PN falls when the constraint is
binding, these two effects imply an increase in labor supply for given wages in the constrained
region.
Importantly, the labor supply is also affected by the possibility that the constraint may be














￿t = ￿ (1 + i)Et
￿





so that the marginal bene￿t of supplying one more unit of labor today is higher, the higher is the
probability that the constraint will be binding in the future. This effect will induce agents to supply
more labor for any given wage, and again the labor supply curve will be steeper relative to the case
in which there is no credit constraint. For given wages, then, this effect tends to increase the level
of non-tradable production and consumption and affects tradable consumption depending on the
substitutability between tradable and non-tradable goods. When goods are complements, increases
in nontradable consumption are associated with an increase in tradable consumption that reduces
the amount agents save in the competitive equilibrium. The opposite would occur if goods were
substitutes.
5In what follows, we refer to the labor supply curve in a diagram in which labor is on the vertical axis and the wage
rate on the horizontal one.
82.2 Firms
















where AN and AT are the productivity levels that are assumed to be random variables in the non-


















































so that the value of the marginal product of labor equals the wage in units of tradable goods (Wt).
















from which we note that the relative price of non-tradable goods determines the allocation of labor
between the two sectors. For given productivity levels, a fall in P N
t drives down the marginal
product of non-tradables and induces a shift of labor toward the tradable sector.
2.3 Aggregation and Equilibrium
2.3.1 Labor Market Equilibrium in a Two-Sector Production Economy
The distinguishing and novel feature of our two-sector production economy is the implication of
sector labor allocation for precautionary saving behavior.
To analyze our mechanism, we characterize the labor market equilibrium and the sector labor







































































































with H = HT + HN: The system of equations (14)-(16) determines Ht, P N
t ; HN
t for given con-
sumption of tradables CT
t ; productivity levels in the two sectors (i.e. AN
t and AT
t ), and the possi-
bility that the constraint is binding, ￿t:6 When the constraint is not binding (i.e., ￿t = 0 ), (14),
(15) and (16) determine the labor market equilibrium along with the relative prices, while changes
in equilibrium CT
t capture the effect of the possibility that the constraint might be binding in the
future.7
The general equilibrium interaction of labor market equilibrium, relative price of non-tradable
goods, and precautionary saving is complex in our two-sector production economy. This inter-
action can generate, in equilibrium, stronger precautionary saving than a one-sector production
economy or endowment economies.
As in the two-sector endowment economy, lower tradable consumption for precautionary sav-
ing reasons leads to a decline in the relative price of non-tradables. For given wages, the decline
in the relative price of non-tradables will induce changes in labor supply and production decisions
that eventually have implications for saving behavior. While total labor supply always increases,
because of the income effect generated by the relative price change, the associated sector reallo-
cation of labor implies a decline in non-tradable labor that, in equilibrium, tends to increase the
relative price of non-tradable goods. If goods are complements, as we assume in the model cali-
bration, the ensuing decline in non-tradable consumption might induce agents to save even more
compared to the endowment economy, and hence amplify the precautionary saving effect coming
from the possibility of a binding borrowing constraint in the future.
The magni￿cation of the precautionary saving effect of a possibly binding borrowing constraint
6In the appendix we determine the sign of the response to total labor supply, the demand of non-tradable and tradable
labor and the relative price of non-tradable for a given change in CT:
7As we explained above, when ￿t = 0 agents will save more compared to the unconstrained economy as they take
into account the possibility that the constraint might bind in the future.
10is a property of a two-sector production economy and does not depend on the way the borrowing
constraint is speci￿ed. In a one-sector production economy with endogenous labor supply, the






= UC(Ct)Wt and the labor supply
schedule would be affected by consumption choices. 8
The mechanism induced by the two-sector production structure is also robust to the way the
collateral constraint is speci￿ed. If we add land to the model and express the collateral constraint
in terms of land price (as in Jeanne and Korinek, 2009, or Bianchi and Mendoza, 2010) the labor
supply and intrasectoral reallocation effects would still operate. This mechanism would also sur-
vive in a context in which there is a working capital constraint as in Bianchi and Mendoza (2010):
as long as the constraint is not binding, the labor market equilibrium conditions would be identical
to the one proposed here ((14), (15) and (16) (with ￿t = 0 )).
2.3.2 Goods Market Equilibrium Conditions
To determine the goods market equilibrium, combine the household budget constraint and the
￿rm’s pro￿ts with the equilibrium condition in the nontradable good market to obtain the current







t ￿ Bt+1 + (1 + i)Bt: (17)





























so that (17) and (19) determines the evolution of the foreign borrowing.
2.4 Social Planner Problem
We now focus on the social planner’s problem. The planner maximizes (1) subject to the resource
constraints (17) and (18), the international borrowing constraint from an aggregate perspective
(19), and the pricing rule of the competitive equilibrium allocation. By constraining the social






= Wt and labor supply would be
independent of consumption choices.
11planner problem to the pricing rule of the competitive equilibrium allocation we follow Kehoe
and Levine (2003) in the characterization of the constrained ef￿cient outcome. Another possibility
would be to use the concept of conditional ef￿ciency in which the planner problem is constrained
by the competitive equilibrium pricing function in which P N
t would be a function of state variables
as in the competitive equilibrium allocation (i.e., P N
t = f(Bt;AN
t ;AT
t ). Here, in the constrained
ef￿cient case we note that the relative price is determined by the competitive rule (9), so that we







































t ; and the￿rst-order























































￿ = ￿2;t; (22)





























































































where ￿1;t is the Lagrange multiplier on (17), ￿2;t is the Lagrange multiplier on (18) and ￿t is the
multiplier on (20).
There are two main differences between the competitive equilibrium ￿rst-order conditions and
those of the planner’s problem introduced by the presence of the occasionally binding borrowing
12constraint. First, equation (21) shows that, in choosing tradable consumption, the planner takes
into account the effects that a change in tradable consumption has on the value of the collateral
(see also Korinek, 2010 and Bianchi, 2009). This is what is usually referred as the "pecuniary
externality" in the related literature, and it occurs when the constraint is binding (i.e., ￿t > 0). As
we noted above, however, even if the constraint is not binding today, the possibility that it might
bind in the future can affect the marginal value of tradable consumption today (i.e., the marginal
value of saving). The Euler equation from the planner perspective becomes
￿1;t = ￿ (1 + i)Et
￿








is given by (21) and takes into account the future effect of the pecuniary exter-
nality. This crucially implies that, at the same allocation, the marginal social value of saving (the
marginal value in the SP allocation), through this effect, will be higher than the private value (in
the CE allocation). Thus, the decentralized equilibrium might display overborrowing. This effect
of the price externality is common in economies in which the collateral constraint is expressed in
terms of a relative price (see Benigno et al., 2010).
A different effect would arise in an economy in which the price externality is modeled through
the presence of an asset price in the credit constraint (e.g., when the value of an asset serves as
collateral rather than income). Because of the forward-looking nature of asset prices, the planner
also takes into account the effect of consumption choices on asset prices through their effects on
the stochastic discount factor. This effect might induce a higher increase in tradable consumption
in the social planner allocation and go in the opposite direction of the price externality one.
In the production economy that we study, the presence of the occasionally binding borrowing
constraint generates an additional mechanism. To see this, we can rewrite the ￿rst-order conditions































and rewrite the non tradable labor supply equation by using (22) and the equilibrium condition in

























































13one extra unit of tradable labor is always positive, while the social marginal value of supplying
one extra unit of non-tradables labor depends on the degree of substitutability between tradable
and non-tradable goods. When goods are substitutes and the borrowing constraint is binding,
the planner always supplies one more unit of non-tradable labor for a given marginal product of
labor, as that helps in relaxing the constraint. However, when goods are complements, the planner
decreases the amount of non-tradable labor supplied at the margin.
Noteherethatthereisaneffectonlaborsupplyalsowhentheconstraintisnotbinding(￿t = 0).



























We can then rewrite the non-tradable labor supply equation by using (22) and the equilibrium































The system of equations given by (26), (27) and (28) determines total labor supply and the sectoral
allocation of labor for given CT; AT
t and AN
t :
There are two effects in our production economy coming from the possibility that the constraint
might bind in the future. The ￿rst one is on total labor supply, while the second is on the substitu-
tion between tradable and non-tradable labor (intratemporal labor reallocation effect). Both effects
are induced by the fact that, in the social planner allocation, current marginal utility of tradable
consumption is higher compared to the competitive equilibrium allocation. Higher current mar-
ginal utility of tradable consumption increases the marginal utility of supplying one unit of labor
today. As a result, in the social planner allocation, labor supply is higher compared to the CE even
when the constraint is not binding. This effect alone can cause underborrowing in equilibrium.
The second effect depends on the intrasectoral labor allocation. Higher current marginal utility
of tradable consumption (i.e. ￿1;t) in the SP implies that, for given total labor supply, the planner
will shift resources towards the tradable sector. This shift will reduce the production and the con-
sumption of non-tradable goods. When goods are complements this reduction in the consumption
of non-tradable consumption will also imply a reduction in tradable consumption, hence increas-
ing the amount agents save in the SP allocation relative to the CE allocation. The shift of labor
14towards tradable production will then tend to strengthen overborrowing in the competitive alloca-
tion compared to the social planner one.9 When goods are substitutes, the decline in non-tradable
consumption leads to an increase in tradable consumption and as such to a decrease in the amount
agents save in the SP allocation compared to the CE allocation. Under substitutability, sectoral
allocation of labor might induce underborrowing in the competitive equilibrium allocation. Note
￿nally that, in equilibrium, sector re-allocation will have a further feedback effect on total labor
supply by affecting wages in units of tradables.
In contrast to what we discussed for the competitive equilibrium, the speci￿cation of the bor-
rowing constraint has implications for the characterization of the social planner allocation. While
the production/labor supply choice is independent of the way the constraint is speci￿ed (equa-
tions (26), (27) and (28) will remain the same), the intertemporal consumption pattern is affected
by the way the planner manipulates the stochastic discount factor when the borrowing constraint
is speci￿ed in terms of asset prices.10 Consider the following experiment in which the planner
decreases future consumption while increasing current consumption: by doing so, the planner in-
creases the pricing kernel and in￿ates asset prices. When the incentive of the planner to manipulate
the intertemporal consumption pattern dominates, marginal utility of tradable consumption today
is lower than in the competitive equilibrium and the possibility of underborrowing arises.
In the papers by Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) and Korinek and Jeanne (2010) this effect is not
present despite the fact that they consider economies in which the borrowing constraint depends
on a key asset price. Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) do not have this effect because, to solve for
the social planner problem, they use the concept of conditional ef￿ciency (i.e., they assume that
the asset price is determined by the asset price function that links the current asset price to the
exogenous and endogenous state variables). By construction, then, the, planner cannot in￿uence

















































































10The following reasoning is based on characterizing the constrained ef￿cient social planner problem as in Kehoe and
Levine (1993) so that the equilibrium condition that determines asset prices in the competitive allocation is taken as a
constraint of the social planner problem.
15the intertemporal path of consumption. 11
3 Solution Methods, Parameter Values, and Model Evaluation
In this section we describe the global solution methods that we use to compute the competitive and
the social planner equilibrium of the model. We then discuss the parameter values chosen and the
model’s ability to ￿t the data for a typical emerging market economy like Mexico.
3.1 Solution Methods
Thecompetitiveequilibriumproblemisgivenbyequations(4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (17)and
(18) above. The algorithm for the solution of the competitive equilibrium of the model is derived
from Baxter (1991) and Coleman (1991), and it involves iterating on the functional equations
that characterize a recursive competitive equilibrium in the states
￿
B;AT￿
. The key step is the
transformation of the complementary slackness conditions on the borrowing constraint into a set
of nonlinear equations that can be solved using standard solvers (in particular, a modi￿ed Powell’s
































































































. This solution is used to update the G￿ function to convergence. Note
that if the constraint binds, ￿
￿




Given the solution for the equilibrium decision rules, we can compute the equilibrium value of
11Using the concept of conditional ef￿ciency also has implications for the behavior of the economy in the binding
region. When the amount of borrowing is constrained, conditional ef￿ciency eliminates the possibility that the planner
might manipulate asset prices, thus forcing the social planner allocation to be closer to the competitive one.
12Note also that ￿t = maxf￿
￿
t;0g
2 ￿ 0, maxf￿￿
￿
t;0g






2 = 0 so the comple-
mentary slackness conditions are satis￿ed.






















































which de￿nes a contraction mapping and thus has a unique solution.13


















































































































We approximate the function V SP using cubic splines and solve the maximization using feasible
sequential quadratic programming.





























































is the lifetime utility experienced using the competitive equilibrium decision
13This functional equation gives us lifetime utility only in equilibrium. To obtain lifetime utility outside equilibrium,
we would need to solve the household problem separating individual debt b from aggregate debt B.
14The rank among allocations would not change if we express welfare gains and losses as a percentage of overall
consumption.
17rules with an extra ￿ percent of tradable consumption given freely to the representative household.
This functional equation de￿nes a contraction mapping, so it has a unique solution. From the


















which yields the percent increase in tradable consumption that renders the representative agent
indifferent between the competitive equilibrium and the social planning allocation state-by-state.
Note that the algorithm to solve the competitive equilibrium of the model can in principle be
implemented with more exogenous or endogenous states in the competitive equilibrium. However,
the algorithm to compute the SP limits our analysis to one endogenous state. To solve the dynamic
programintheSPweneedtopreservetheshapeofV SP, andthisisonlypossibleinonedimension.
As the main purpose of the analysis is comparing the two allocations, this constrains the degree of
complexity of the model we can analyze.
3.2 Parameter Values
The model is calibrated at quarterly frequency on Mexico data. There are several reasons to fo-
cus on Mexico. First, Mexico is a representative emerging market economy whose experience is
particularly relevant for the main issue addressed in the paper. Mexico experienced three major
episodes of international capital ￿ows reversals since 1980 that are unambiguously regarded as
typical examples of sudden stops: the ￿rst one leading to the 1982 debt crisis; the second one,
the well-known ￿Tequila crisis￿ in 1994-1995; and the third one in 2008-09 during the global ￿-
nancial crisis that led Mexico to seek (or accept) IMF ￿nancial assistance. Second, Mexico is a
well-functioning, relatively large, market-based economy in which production in both the trad-
able and non-tradable sectors of the economy goes well beyond the extraction of natural resources
such as oil or other commodities. Third, there is a substantial body of previous quantitative work
on Mexico, starting from Mendoza (1991), which greatly facilitates the choice of the parameter
values of the model. In particular, we choose model parameters following the work of Mendoza
(2002, 2010) and Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) to the extent possible, and we use available data where
necessary to complement or update this previous work.
The speci￿c set of parameter values that we use in our baseline calibration is reported in Table
1. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is set to standard value of ￿ = 2, as in Mendoza
(2002, 2010). We then set the world interest rate to i = 0:01587, which yields an annual real rate
of interest of about 6.5 percent, as in Mendoza (2002): a value that is between the 5 percent of
Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) and the 8.6 percent of Mendoza (2010).
The elasticity of intratemporal substitution in consumption between tradables and nontradables
18is an important parameter in the analysis as we discussed in the previous section. But there is a
good degree of consensus in the literature on its value. We follow Ostry and Reinhart (1992),
who estimates a value of ￿ = 0:760 for developing countries. This is a conservative assumption
compared to the value of 0:5 used by Kehoe and Ruhl (2008), which is closer to the one assumed
for an advanced, more closed economy like the United States.
Estimates of the wage elasticity of labor supply in Mexico are uncertain at best (Mendoza, 2002
and 2010). We set the value of ￿ = 2, as in Mendoza (2002), close to the value of 1:84 adopted by
Mendoza (2010).
The labor share of income, (1 ￿ ￿T) and (1 ￿ ￿N) is set to 0.66 in both the tradable and
non-tradable sectors: a standard value, close to that used by Mendoza (2002), and consistent with
empirical evidence on the aggregate share of labor income in GDP in household survey of Garc￿a-
Verdœ (2005).














where "t is an iid N(0;￿2
A) innovation. The parameters of this process are set to ￿A = 0:537 and
￿A = 0:0134, which are the ￿rst autocorrelation and the standard deviation of aggregate total factor
productivity reported by Mendoza (2010). Both the average value of AT and the constant AN are
set to one.
The remaining three model parameters￿the share of tradable consumption in the consumption
basket (!), the credit constraint parameter (￿), and the discount factor (￿)￿are set by iterating
on a routine that minimizes the sum of squared differences between the moments in the ergodic
distribution of the competitive equilibrium of the model and three data targets. The data targets
are a CN=CT ratio of 1.643, a 35 percent debt-to-GDP ratio, and an unconditional probability of
sudden stop of 2 percent per quarter. This CN=CT ratio is the value implied by the following
ratios estimated by Mendoza (2002): Y T=Y N =0.648, CT=Y T =0.665; and CN=Y N =0.708 as
in Mendoza (2002).15 The debt-to-GDP target is Mexico’s average net foreign asset to annual GDP
ratio, from 1970 to 2008, in the updated version of the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) data set.
The target for the unconditional probability of sudden stop is more dif￿cult to pin down. De-
spite a signi￿cant body of empirical work on identifying sudden stops in emerging markets in
order to describe the macroeconomic dynamics around these events, there is no consensus in the
literature on how to de￿ne sudden stops empirically, and hence no accepted measure of the uncon-
ditional probability of these events. By focusing on Mexico, we can pin down this target simply
and unambiguously, measuring it as the relative frequency, on a quarterly basis, of Mexico’s sud-
15Ratios computed with updated data are essentially the same. As we evaluate the model’s ability to replicate the 1995
Tequila crisis we use the exact values reported by Mendoza (2002).
19den stops years over the period 1975-2010. This assumes that, as generally accepted, 1982, 1995,
and 2009 were sudden stop years for Mexico. The resulting 2 percent is very close to the 1.9 per-
cent implied by the empirical analysis of Jeanne and RanciŁre (2010) over the period 1975-2003,
who use an ￿absolute￿ de￿nition of sudden stops as current account reversals larger than 5 per-
cent of GDP. Our number is also similar to the 2.2 percent value implied by Calvo, Izquierdo, and
Mej￿a (2008) for the period 1990-2004, based on a ￿relative￿ de￿nition of sudden stops as current
account reversals larger than two standard deviations. The two percent value, however, is at the
low end of the range of values estimated in these studies by pooling data for the whole sample of
emerging markets considered.
In order to contrast Mexico data with model outcomes during sudden stop episodes, consistent
with both the model and the empirical literature above, we de￿ne a sudden stop in the model
as an event in which: (a) ￿t > 0 (i.e., the international borrowing constraint is binding) and (b)
(Bt+1￿Bt) > 2￿(Bt+1￿Bt)(i.e., thecurrentaccountorchangesinthenetforeignassetpositionin
a given period exceed two times its standard deviation). The ￿rst criterion is a purely model-based
de￿nition of sudden stop. The second criterion allows us to consider only model events in which
there are large current account reversals, in line with the aforementioned empirical literature.16 17
With the targets above we obtain ! = 0:3526; ￿ = 0:9717, and ￿ = 0:415. The implied value
of ! is slightly higher than in Mendoza (2002) and slightly lower than targeted by Kehoe and Ruhl
(2008). The implied annual value of ￿ yields an annual discount factor of 0.8915, only slightly
lower than in Kehoe and Ruhl (2008).18 The implied value of ￿ is lower than in Mendoza (2002),
who however calibrates it to the deterministic steady state of the model, and there are no standard
benchmarks for this model parameter in the literature.
3.3 Model Evaluation
The class of models we study is potentially capable of describing well both the cycle and the
crisis periods of an emerging market economy like Mexico (Mendoza, 2010). However, in our
implementation of the model, we shut down a number of shocks used in other work and focus on
the mechanisms driving our policy results. With our one shock we clearly cannot match all the
16The de￿nition of sudden stop typically used in the empirical literature focuses on large capital ￿ows reversals because
some smaller ones may be due to terms of trade changes or other factors. Jeanne and RanciŁre (2008), for instance,
exclude commodity importers and oil producers, while Calvo, Izquierdo and Mej￿a . (2008) add other criteria to the
second one we use above.
17Note that national accounts data typically have a trend, and hence the empirical literature focuses on changes in the
current account, or the ￿rst difference of the capital ￿ows. As our model has no trend growth and the data are in
percent deviation from HP ￿lter, we focus on the current account rather than its change. We obtain similar results
when we de￿ne the sudden stop with respect to changes in the current account.
18This value is not comparable to the one assumed by Mendoza (2002) as he uses an endogenous discount factor
speci￿cation. In our model, the presence of the borrowing constraint removes the necessity to introduce any device to
induce a stationary ergodic distribution of foreign borrowing.
20moments of the data that this class of models is capable of replicating. Nonetheless, it is useful to
see how well our one-shock model does do in describing both the business cycle and the dynamics
around a typical sudden stop event, as the ￿rst exercise is standard and helps us to understand the
￿ndings in the second one.
To conduct this comparison we use the variable as de￿ned in Table 2. All data variables are
reported in percent deviations from HP ￿ltered trend (over the 1993Q1-2007Q4 period) except the
current account, which is reported as a share of GDP. All model variables are reported in percent
deviation from ergodic mean except the current account that is reported, as in the data, as a share
of GDP. To calculate model moments we simulate the model for 1,000,000 time periods, and retain
the ￿nal 10,000 simulation periods to calculate moments and identify sudden stop events.
Table 3 reports data and simulated second moments. Despite its simplicity, the model describes
the data reasonably well except for the behavior of the tradable GDP that is counterfactual because
of the behavior of labor supply when the constraint is binding in our model economy. As we can
see, once we normalize all standard deviations relative to GDP in units of tradable goods (as in
Bianchi, 2010), the model roughly matches the ranking of the data volatilities consistent with the
results in Mendoza (2002), despite the fact that the model has only one shock. In particular, the
model generates consumption volatility that is almost as high as GDP volatility and a current ac-
count that is less volatile than aggregate GDP or its components. The model, however, produces
higher relative price volatility and excessively low tradable GDP volatility relative to the data (i.e.,
relative to GDP volatility).19 As in the data, all model variables are similarly persistent, but less
than in the data (especially for the relative price on non-tradable goods and tradable GDP). All
correlations with GDP except the relative price one are also roughly consistent with the data. The
correlation between CA and GDP is positive, contrary to what we observe in the data. This is be-
cause, as calibrated to Mexican data, the constraint does not alter consumption smoothing enough
in the ergodic distribution of our model to generate such a negative correlation.20 Additionally
note that the correlation between CA and net income (de￿ned as GDP minus investment and gov-
ernment expenditure, and hence closer to our model de￿nition) may be either slightly positive or
zero in the average emerging market economy (Luo, Nie, and Young, 2010). Indeed, as is well
known (Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, 1994), a model with investment would generate a negative
correlation.
Similar strengths and weaknesses emerge by comparing the macroeconomic dynamics around
a typical sudden stop event. For this comparison, we focus on the 1995 Tequila crisis, the same
episode studied by Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) and Mendoza (2010). Speci￿cally, Figure 1 compares
19Note that, using data up to 2007, as we do, the absolute value of consumption volatility in the data is much lower
than reported by Mendoza (2002), and hence much closer to GDP volatility.
20For instance, Bianchi (2010) obtains a negative correlation calibrating the model to Argentine data with very high
shock variance and a low discount factor.
21the model and the Mexican data for key variables four quarters before and after 1995Q1, where
the model variables are average across the identi￿ed sudden stop episodes, four periods before and
four periods after our sudden stop de￿nition is initially met.21
As we can see from Figure 1, the model qualitatively reproduces the large declines in expen-
diture on consumption and output (both expressed in units of tradable goods), and the relative
price of tradable during the 1995 Tequila crisis in Mexico. However, in the model this relative
price decline is less persistent than in the data. Similarly, qualitatively, non-tradable output and
expenditure on non-tradable consumption measured in units of tradables are described relatively
well by the model. The same lack of persistence characterizes all model variables that generally
recover much faster than in the data. We note also that consumption expenditure falls much more
than output in our model economy since, in the model, tradable output increases in sudden stop.
Consistent with the data, tradable GDP also starts to fall sharply before the sudden stops, but it
increases during the sudden stop period, counterfactually. As a result, tradable consumption falls
much less than non-tradable consumption, while in the data the opposite occurs.
Quantitatively, however, the model produces a sudden stop dynamics of an amplitude roughly
one order of magnitude smaller than in the data. This occurs for two reasons. First, as we noted
above, the model is too simple to provide an accurate quantitative account of the data: in particular,
we limit ourselves to only one shock in tradable productivity while other shocks (e.g., foreign
interest rate shocks) might have contributed to amplifying the dynamic of the economy during a
sudden stop. Second, and more importantly, the model counterfactually predicts an increase in
total employment at the sudden stop, driven by a sharp increase in labor supply and a fall in the
real wage (not reported).
As Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) discuss, there are three ways to generate falling employment in the
model: a friction in the labor mobility across sectors, variable capital utilization, and a working
capital constraint, but none produces a satisfactory account of labor market dynamics during the
Tequila crisis in their model. In addition, in our model they pose additional complications. Im-
perfect labor mobility and variable capital utilization introduce an additional state variable. But,
as we noted earlier, the comparison between the competitive and the social planner allocation that
is the focus of the paper constrains the number of endogenous state variables that can feature in
our model. A working capital constraint could produce falling output, but would complicate the
speci￿cation of the borrowing constraint. In addition a working capital constraint would generate
output falling at the sudden stop, but would not alter the underlying mechanism at work in the re-
gion in which we examine inef￿cient borrowing (i.e., during tranquil times) so that our discussion
21As is evident in the capital ￿ow data (not reported), while capital ￿ows into Mexico started to reverse in the fourth
quarter of 1994, they were initially accommodated by a very large decrease in of￿cial reserves that eventually led to
collapse of the ￿xed exchange rate regime in December 1994. As a result, the current account started to revese only in
1995Q1.
22on the role of macro-prudential policies would be robust to this change. For these reasons, at ￿rst
pass, we prefer to keep the model simple.
4 Inef￿cient Borrowing and Macro-Prudential Policies
In this section we report and discuss a comparison between the competitive equilibrium allocation
and the social planner one based on a full numerical solution of our two-sector, production model.
In this section, we also discuss the robustness of the analysis to changes in key parameter values
and its policy implications for the debate on macro-prudential policies.22
4.1 Comparing CE and SP Allocations
The policy function for foreign borrowing, Bt+1, is plotted in Figure 2, conditional on a particular
state of the tradable shock. The decision rules are drawn assuming this shock is received in each
period. The continuous line refers to the competitive equilibrium (CE) allocation, while the dotted
line refers to the social planner one (SP). The ￿gure shows that there is slight underborrowing
when the constraint is not binding and a much larger one when the constraint binds￿i.e., for each
value of the endogenous state Bt, Bt+1 is smaller in the CE than in the SP throughout the support
of the decision rule. This result shows that, in our model, in which there is scope for both ex ante
and ex post inef￿ciencies, the latter are quantitatively much larger than the former.
These￿ndingsareinsharpcontrastwiththoseintherelatedliterature￿Bianchi(2010), Bianchi
and Mendoza (2010) and Korinek and Jeanne (2010). The literature, has focused only on ex ante
inef￿ciencies (i.e., when the constraint does not bind) in models in which ex post ef￿ciencies do
not arise. In contrast, Figure 2 shows that in a model in which both ex ante and ex post ef￿ciencies
can arise, the ex ante inef￿ciency found is not only smaller than the ex post one, but it also goes in
the opposite direction. Note that the borrowing inef￿ciency that we document in our benchmark
economy calls for both ex ante and ex post policy intervention geared toward inducing more rather
than less borrowing than private agents choose to take on, both before and after the constraint
binds.
Figures 3 and 4 report the policy functions for the other key variables of the model as a function
of the endogenous state, Bt. The policy functions are drawn for the continued realization of the
same shock. All variables (P N
t , Wt, HT
t , HN
t and Ht, CT
t , CN
t and Ct) follow a similar pattern in
both allocations displaying a kink in correspondence of the state in which the constraint becomes
binding.23 As the economy moves toward the binding region, agents (and the planner) increase the
22The properties of the competitive equilibrium of this economy are well known (see for instance Mendoza, 2002), and
are fully discussed in Benigno et al. (2009 and 2010).
23Note that the kink of the decision rules in the SP occurs at a higher level of Bt than in the CE because the SP borrow
23amount they want to borrow and reduce their tradable and non-tradable consumption (Figure 4).
In this transition, before the constraint binds, the relative price of non-tradables falls in both the
competitive and the social planner allocation. Note, though, that the relative price of non-tradable
goods in the SP allocation is higher compared to the CE allocation in the non-binding region as the
social planner consumes relatively more tradables (i.e., borrows more in equilibrium) in normal
times. As we discussed above, in our two-sector production economy, there is an additional effect
coming from the intrasectoral labor allocation on precautionary saving when goods are comple-
ments, so that in our competitive allocation consumption of tradable goods is further reduced in
normal times. Since the relative price of non-tradables is lower in the CE allocation compared
to the SP one, the sector allocation of labor (see equation (13)) is such that in the CE there is
overproduction of tradables and under-production of non-tradables relative to the SP (Figure 4).
Once the constraint binds we observe two important differences between the CE allocation and
the SP one. First, as already noted, the differences between the decision rules of the CE and the SP
are much larger than in "normal times." Second, the SP engineers an increase in P N
t , accompanied
by a decrease in non-tradable production, while in the CE allocation the relative price decreases
and non-tradable production rises.
These differences arises because of the way the planner deals with the constraint compared to
how private agents do. In our production economy, increasing the value of the collateral in units
of tradables could occur by increasing the production of tradables and/or by increasing the value
of non-tradable production. As the social planner takes into account the impact of its consumption
and production decisions on the relative price of non-tradable goods, it increases the value of col-
lateral by increasing this price (and hence the value of non-tradable production in units of tradable
goods) rather than by increasing the amount of non-tradable goods produced. In the SP allocation,
a combination of relatively higher consumption of tradables (i.e., more borrowing) and lower con-
sumption of non-tradables (i.e., by reducing the production of non-tradables) leads to an increase
in the relative price. The SP also increases the production of tradable goods but less so than in
the CE allocation so that total labor supply rises but less than in the CE allocation. Private agents,
on the other hand, tend to increase their borrowing capacity by producing more of both tradables
and non-tradables. In doing so they do not internalize the effects of their production decisions on
the relative price of non-tradable goods, and in equilibrium we observe a lower relative price that
tends to further tighten the constraint.
Figure 5 compares the ergodic distributions of foreign borrowing in the CE and the SP allo-
cation. The ￿gure shows the under-borrowing that characterizes our benchmark economy, as the
more on average than the CE. As we shall see below, however, this does not mean that the SP is more constrained than
the CE since the lower bound on debt is determined by the intersection between the policy functions for each state
with the 45 degree line at different values.
24CE distribution is located to the right of the SP one. Nonetheless, the mean debt-to-GDP ration of
these two distributions is the same (i.e., 35 percent), with only slightly smaller average debt in the
CE than in the SP (-0.914 and -0.941 in the CE and the SP, respectively).24
Despite having the same mean, the shape of these two distributions is very different. The shape
of the borrowing distribution depends on the location of the intersection of the policy function
at different values of the exogenous state with the 45 degree line (not reported), which in turn
depends on the shape of policy function itself. In the SP, these intersections occur on a more dis-
persed portion of the distribution’s support. As a result, the distribution does not display truncation
and appears "unconstrained." However, in CE, the intersection between the policy functions for
different values of the exogenous state and the 45 degree line is concentrated to the left, and the
distribution of the CE appears truncated.
The probability of running into a crisis episode re￿ects this difference in the shape of the
ergodic distribution. In the benchmark CE allocation, the unconditional probability of a crisis is 2
percent on a quarterly basis. In the SP allocation, this probability is 1.2 percent, despite the same
average level of foreign borrowing as a share of GDP. The intuition is that, by allocating productive
resources differently, the social planner increases the value of the collateral through an increase in
relative prices and permits more borrowing in response to negative shocks without increasing its
probability of meeting the constraint.
The overall differences in the CE and SP allocations are re￿ected in the calculation of the
welfare gains of moving from the CE to the SP allocation. Despite the same average borrowing,
the SP achieves not only a lower probability of a crisis, but also higher welfare. The welfare cost
of inef￿cient borrowing in our baseline production economy is 0.12 percent of permanent tradable
consumption (Table 5). And the welfare gain of moving from the CE to the SP equilibrium in
states of the worlds in which the constraint binds is about 25 percent higher than the overall cost
(at 0.15 percent of permanent tradable consumption (Table 5).25
The intuition for this result is that welfare is state dependent in this class of models (see, for
instance, Figure 5 for a selected number of endogenous and exogenous states). The largest differ-
ences in the behavior of these economies arise in the states in which the constraint is binding. And
given that the economy spends most of its time outside these states, the overall welfare difference
between the two allocations is smaller than the welfare difference in those states. It follows that
the welfare difference between the CE and the SP in normal times is even smaller than the overall
difference (which includes the sudden stop).
24GDP is higher in the SP (0.6674) than in the CE allocation (0.6486).
25See Section 3 for details on the de￿nitions and computations of these welfare gains and losses.
254.2 Robustness
Inthissubsectionweexploretheextenttowhichtheunderborrowingresultfoundinourbenchmark
economy is robust to changes in parameter values. We change the parameters that could be critical
in determining the sign of the inef￿cient borrowing (see Benigno at al., 2010). We focus on three
key parameters: the elasticity of intratemporal substitution that determines the sign of the sector
allocationeffect, thediscount factorthat determinesthe strengthof theintertemporal effect, and the
variance of the shocks. Figure 7 reports the decision rule and the ergodic distribution of B(t + 1).
Tables 4 and 5 report the average borrowing as a share of GDP and the probability of sudden stop,
along with the welfare gains, respectively, for the benchmark case and these three other cases.26
Figure 7 (second row of panels) shows that the results are qualitatively unchanged when we
set the elasticity of substitution between tradables and non-tradables to 1.25 (i.e., assuming substi-
tutability rather than complementarity), even though the underborrowing is quantitatively smaller.
This is evidenced by a smaller differences between the CE and the SP for the same endogenous
and exogenous state and an ergodic distribution of CE borrowing that remains to the right of the
SP one. A change in the elasticity of substitution does not affect the marginal utility of tradable
consumption, but it has an impact on labor choices through the non-tradable relative price. When
the elasticity of substitution increases the change in the relative price in both the CE and SP al-
location is smaller for a given change in tradable consumption, and the smaller change in relative
prices reduces the labor supply effect in both the CE and SP allocation. In addition, the decrease in
non-tradable production and consumption that follows from labor market equilibrium (see Appen-
dix A) is now accompanied by an increase in tradable consumption so that the initial precautionary
saving impact on tradable consumption is dampened. With our calibration, the net outcome of
these effects is such that underborrowing is smaller compared to the benchmark case in which
goods are complements, but it is not eliminated.
Table 5 also shows that, in this case, the probability of sudden stop is higher than in the bench-
mark case in the CE (2.6 percent) and much lower in the SP (0.35 percent): on the one hand,
higher substitutability implies that the relative price drops less than when goods are complements
and that helps in relaxing the constraint. On the other hand, substitutability implies that precau-
tionary saving is reduced and agents borrow more for a given state, increasing the probability of
hitting the constraint. In the CE allocation, the second effect dominate the ￿rst one, leading to a
higher probability of sudden stop. In the SP allocation, instead, the ￿rst effect prevails reducing
the probability of sudden stop. The welfare gains in moving to the SP allocation are lower (0.0525
percent, Table 5), since the cost of being in a sudden stop are smaller in this case.
Underborrowing increases signi￿cantly with a lower discount factor, as evidenced by the fact
26In each case, the parameter is changed as reported in Tables 4 and 5, without recalibrating the model.
26that the ergodic distributions are much further apart than in the baseline case (Figure 7, third
row of panels). Lowering the discount factor to 0.91 makes agents more impatient and reduces
precautionary saving so that agents borrow more in both the CE and SP allocations. Both the
CE and the SP meet the constraint more frequently, but in the SP allocation the unconditional
probability of sudden stop is higher than in the CE allocation (from 1.2 in the baseline case to 2.2
with higher discount factor, Table 5). This suggests that the social planner does not necessarily
need to reduce the probability of a sudden stop relative to the CE. The reason is that the planner
reduces the cost of being in the sudden stop so that even if the welfare gain of moving from the CE
to the SP remains positive (0.0351 overall, Table 5), they are smaller than in the baseline case.
When we triple the variance of the shocks, underborrowing is strengthened compared to the
baseline if measured as the gap between the SP and CE ergodic distribution (Figure 7, fourth row of
panels). Once we increase the variance of the shock, there is such an increase in the precautionary
saving in both the CE and the SP so that the probability of a sudden stop goes to zero in both
allocations. Yet, the shape of the two distributions is different. In the case of the CE, the borrowing
distribution is truncated. In the SP is seemingly unconstrained for the reasons explained above. In
this case, however, the welfare gain of moving from the CE to the SP is very small, as these gains
accrue only in normal times.
4.3 Implications for Macro-Prudential Policy
In the numerical analysis we have found that underborrowing is a robust feature of the competitive
allocation of our two-sector production model. We found that the welfare gains of moving from
the CE to the SP in sudden stop states are much larger than in tranquil times and that, for the same
or a higher level of borrowing, ef￿ciency is not necessarily associated with a lower probability of
crisis. What are the implications of these results for macro-prudential policies?
First, ex post policies (i.e., policy interventions in crisis states) are more important than ex ante
ones (i.e. ,policy interventions during tranquil times). Indeed, in our analysis, welfare gains are
always signi￿cantly higher in sudden stop states than in other states. Note here, however, that we
are abstracting from moral hazard and time consistency considerations.
Second, these result illustrate that constrained ef￿ciency can be achieved not only by outright
reducing borrowing and the probability of a crisis, as suggested by the existing literature, but also
by allocating productive resources more ef￿ciently in both normal and crisis times. In the ef￿cient
allocation, relative prices move in such a way that the economy is less vulnerable to the presence
of occasionally binding ￿nancial frictions. This is because, as we mentioned earlier, our social
planner tends to relax the constraint by changing relative prices rather than quantities. Broadly
speaking, this would be consistent with the "old adage" that it is how capital is intermediated and
27allocated that matters, not how much funds come into a small open economy. After all, the very
presence of a ￿nancial friction suggests that in a ￿rst best world these economies would like to
borrow more, not less.27
Another way to restate the point above is to note that crises are not completely eliminated by
the social planner, and neither probability of a crisis nor the level of borrowing are good policy
objectives. While in general the social planner tends to reduce the unconditional probability of the
crisis, there might be cases (for example when agents are impatient) in which the unconditional
probability of sudden stop chosen by the social planner is higher than in the competitive equilib-
rium. More broadly, there is a trade-off between volatility and ef￿ciency in this class of models,
and minimizing the probability of the crisis is not necessarily a good criterion to orient policy. In
welfare terms, in certain cases, the gains of higher average consumption may outweigh the costs of
a more volatile consumption because of the more frequent sudden stops. In these cases, a planner
that takes this trade-off into account may allocate resources in such a way as to allow for higher
and more volatile consumption to achieve ef￿ciency. It follows that the appropriate policy regime
depends on the speci￿c characteristics of the economy.
Third, if the design of ex ante policies is sensitive to the structure of the economy, the wrong
policy regime might impose costs that exceeds its intended bene￿ts. These costs can be easily
quanti￿ed in our benchmark economy by imposing a small tax on debt (a Tobin tax) equal to 1
percent in tranquil times and zero once the crisis occurs. This simple state-contingent policy rule
implements in our model speci￿c proposals in terms of macro-prudential policies in the related
literature. Figure 8 reports the results for this experiment (as well as for the case in which the
same rule is not state-contingent) and shows that such a rule is not robust to the speci￿cation of
the model. In this case, as expected, average borrowing as a share of GDP is unchanged and the
probability of sudden stop goes to zero. However, the Tobin tax moves the economy further away
from the constrained-ef￿cient allocation as evidenced by negative welfare gains in moving from
the CE with Tobin tax to that without. The tax forces agents to save more (moving the ergodic
distribution of debt to the right of the CE without tax), and the probability of a sudden stop goes
to zero, but welfare declines. This implies that the distortion introduced by the policy intervention
is more costly in welfare terms than the bene￿t of reducing to zero the probability of the crisis. It
follows that from a policymaker’s perspective minimizing the probability of the crisis or targeting
the level of borrowing are not necessarily welfare-improving criteria.
27See Mendoza (2002) and Benigno et al. (2010) for a quantitative comparison with an unconstrained economy.
285 Conclusions
In this paper we compared the competitive and the social planner allocations in a two-sector small
open production economy with an occasionally binding borrowing constraint. Our economy be-
longs to a class of models that can potentially match both normal ￿uctuations and crisis events.
We ￿nd that the interaction between saving and production decisions by agents in the competitive
equilibrium leads to underborrowing. Moreover, our welfare analysis shows that higher welfare
costs arise at crisis times. These results suggest that macro-prudential policies aimed at reducing
the amount of borrowing or the probability of a crisis might be counterproductive and ex post poli-
cies entail higher welfare gains than ex ante ones. Our analysis suggests that the distortionary costs
imposed by macro-prudential policies may be bigger than the bene￿t of eliminating the probability
of crisis events. In our related work (Benigno et al., 2009) we study these policy issues further by
discussing the proper choice of the instrument and proposing a Ramsey approach to the optimal
policy problem that takes into account interaction between ex ante and ex post policies.
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Economic Research. A Appendix. Labor Market Equilibrium in CE Allocation



















so that, among other things, the response of total hours worked to a change in precautionary sav-
ings depends on labor intensities in the two sector and on whether the country is producing more
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> 0;
where hT = HT






! (P N)1￿k < 1
so that unambiguously dHN=dCT > 0. The response of HT to a change in precautionary savings
















which implies that HT and HN always move in opposite directions after a change in precaution-
ary savings and so that dHT=dCT < 0. Finally, dHN=dCT > 0, dHT=dCT < 0 implies that
dP N=dCT > 0:
33Table 1. Model Parameters
Structural parameters Values
Elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods κ =0 .760
Intertemporal substitution and risk aversion ρ =2
Labor supply elasticity δ =2
Credit constraint parameter φ =0 .415
Labor share in production 1 − αT =1− αN =0 .66
Relative weight of tradable and non-tradable goods ω =0 .3526
Discount factor β =0 .9717
Exogenous variables Values
World real interest rate i =0 .01587
Steady state productivity level AN = AT =1
Productivity process
Persistence ρεT =0 .5370
Volatility σεT =0 .0134
Average values in the ergodic distribution
Net foreign assets (or minus foreign borrowing) B = −0.9080
Qaurterly GDP Y =0 .6486
Qaurterly Tradable GDP Y T =0 .2544
Qaurterly Non-Tradable GDP Y N =0 .3942Table 2. Variable Definitions
Variables Model Data 1/
GDP Y=YT+YN National Accounts, production accounts, GDP, 2003 prices.
Non-Tradable GDP YN=PN*HN^0.66 National Accounts, production accounts, GDP, tertiary sectors, 2003 prices.
Tradable GDP YT=EXP(ESPILON)*HT^0.66 National Accounts, production accounts, GDP, secondary sectors, 2003 prices.
Relative Price of Non-Tradable PN=((1-omega)/omega)(CN/CT)^(kappa-1) Consumer price of services relative to consumer price of merchandise, indexes, base 2002Q2. 
Consumption Expenditure C=CT+PN*CN National Accounts, expenditure accounts, Private Consumption, 1993 prices.
Non-Tradable Consumption CN=YN National Accounts, expenditure accounts, Services plus nationally produced non-durable goods, 1993 prices.
Tradable Consumption CT=(1+i)*B(t)+YT-B(t+1) National Accounts, expenditure accounts, Imported goods plus nationally produced durable goods, 1993 prices.
Current Account CA(t)=(B(t+1)-B(t))/Y Balance of payment statistics, Current account balance to GDP.
1/ Data sources:
    National accounts are from INEGI, Banco de Información Económica (BIE), http://dgcnesyp.inegi.org.mx/bdiesi/bdie.html.
    Consumer price indexes are from Banco de Mexico (Consulta; series SP68277  and SP56335, respectively),  http://www.banxico.org.mx/sitioingles/polmoneinflacion/estadisticas/cpi/cpi.htm .
    Current account and GDP in US dollar are from the IDB Latin Macro Watch (LMW), http://www.iadb.org/Research/LatinMacroWatch/lmw.cfm.Table 3. Model Evaluation: Second Moments of the Data and the Competitive Equilibrium (CE)
St. Dev. St. Dev. Realtive to GDP First Autocorrelation Correlation with GDP
Data Data CE Data CE Data CE
GDP 2.4% 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.5 1.00 1.00
Non‐Tradable GDP 2.2% 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.97 0.97
Tradable GDP 3.4% 1.4 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.96 0.91
Consumption Expenditure 2.6% 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.91 0.98
Relative Price of Non‐Tradable 2.5% 1.0 2.9 0.9 0.5 0.26 0.85
Current Account (In percent of GDP) 2.1% 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.5 ‐0.61 0.98Table 4. Average foreign borrowing and probability of a sudden stop
Annual average debt in the ergodic distribution CE SP
(Percent of annual GDP)
Benchmark 35.0 35.0
κ =1 .25 35.0 35.0
β =0 .91 35.0 35.0
σεT =0 .04 32.0 33.0
β =0 .91 and σεT =0 .04 35.0 35.0
Fixed Tobin tax (1 percent) 35.0 na
State-Contingent Tobin tax (1 percent outside sudden stop) 35.0 na
Quarterly unconditional sudden stop probabilities
(Percent per quarter)
Benchmark 2.00 1.20
κ =1 .25 2.60 0.35
β =0 .91 2.05 2.21
σεT =0 .04 0.00 0.00
β =0 .91 and σεT =0 .04 3.60 2.20
Fixed Tobin tax (1 percent) 0.00 na
State-Contingent Tobin tax (1 percent outside sudden stop) 0.00 naTable 5. Welfare gain of moving from the CE to the SP
(In percent of permanent consumption)
Overall At the sudden stop
Benchmark 0.1230 0.1500
κ =1 .25 0.0525 0.0752
β =0 .91 0.0351 0.0390
σεT =0 .04 0.0013 na
β =0 .91 and σεT =0 .04 0.0430 0.0580
Fixed Tobin tax (1 percent) 1/ -0.00049 -0.00061
State-Contingent Tobin tax (1 percent outside sudden stop) 1/ -0.00024 -0.00035
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